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Abstract 
Political geographers have recently focused their attention on the performative nature 
and imaginative geographies of US security strategies. This work has illuminated a 
number of mechanisms through which geographical knowledge has been interpreted 
and reformulated to support specific political agendas. This paper builds upon and 
develops the insights of these recent studies, arguing that current US security 
strategies are constructed around a policy of integration, whereby states are 
encouraged, through a range of measures, to mesh with attitudes and perspectives on 
the world. It assesses the ways in which these integration strategies are being 
performed, through an analysis of US National Security Strategy documents, the 
works of writers such as Kagan and Barnett, and the imaginative geographies and 
popular geopolitical representations of the US and its enemies. This paper contends 
that these practices combine to produce the effects that they name, bringing to life an 
imaginary geography that mirrors and supports the particular logics of the US-led war 
on terror. 
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Performing security: the imaginative geographies of current US strategy 
 
INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING PERFORMATIVITY 
 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the relationship between 
imaginative geographies and the foreign and security policies of states (Agnew, 2003; 
Cainkar, 2004; Power and Crampton, 2005). Such policies are said to be both enabled 
by and productive of specific geographical imaginations. Too often, though, these 
analyses are understood as advocating a form of social constructivism, whereby 
linguistic enunciations and textual statements are (the critics maintain) determinative 
of material practices. This conception invites a misreading of 
constructivism-as-philosophical-idealism, leading to the assertion that if policy 
makers thought differently the world would automatically be different. Even within 
critical geopolitics a trace of this concern is evident when we are warned that the 
project of critical geopolitics “should not be condensed to a formulaic 
deconstructionism of the politics of identity in texts” (Ó Tuathail, 2003: 164).  
 
In this paper we critically examine recent developments in US strategy, drawing 
attention to the way in which the imagination of place creates political and spatial 
realities (Gregory, 2004a; Kuus, 2004; Murphy et al, 2004). This argument relies, in 
the first instance, on an exploration of the new security texts that have been produced 
in the post-Cold War era and, more recently, in the aftermath of the attacks of 
September 11
th
 2001, an event which has attracted much attention in the field (see 
Harvey, 2003, 2005; Smith, 2005; Sparke, 2005).  
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However, we wish to reposition the terms of the debate by arguing that in the 
discursive production of imaginative geographies it is performativity rather than 
construction which is the better theoretical assumption. Discourse refers to a specific 
series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, 
identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes 
made more or less possible Those employing the concept are often said to be claiming 
that „everything is language,‟ that „there is no reality‟, and because of their linguistic 
idealism, they are unable to take a political position and defend an ethical stance. 
 
These objections demonstrate how understandings of discourse are bedevilled by the 
view that interpretation involves only language in contrast to the external, the real, 
and the material. These dichotomies of idealism/materialism and realism/idealism 
remain powerful conceptions of understanding the world. In practice, however, a 
concern with discourse does not involve a denial of the world‟s existence or the 
significance of materiality. This is well articulated by Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 108): 
“the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism 
opposition...What is denied is not that...objects exist externally to thought, but the 
rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of 
any discursive condition of emergence.” This means that while nothing exists outside 
of discourse, there are important distinctions between linguistic and non-linguistic 
phenomena. There are also modes of representation which are ideational though 
strictly non-linguistic, such as the aesthetic and pictorial. It is just that there is no way 
of comprehending non-linguistic and extra-discursive phenomena except through 
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discursive practices. 
 
Understanding discourse as involving both the ideal and the material, the linguistic 
and the non-linguistic, means that discourses are performative. Performative means 
that discourses constitute the objects of which they speak. For example, states are 
made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration 
policies, military deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social 
behaviour, political speeches and economic investments. The meanings, identities, 
social relations and political assemblages that are enacted in these performances 
combine the ideal and the material. They are either made or represented in the name 
of a particular state but that state does not pre-exist those performances. As a 
consequence, appreciating that discourses are performative moves us away from a 
reliance on the idea of (social) construction towards materialization, whereby 
discourse “stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface” 
(Butler, 1993: 9, 12). Discourse is thus not something that subjects use in order to 
describe objects; it is that which constitutes both subjects and objects.  
 
While performativity has been embraced by some domains of geography (notably 
cultural geography; see Nash, 2000) it has had to date little influence in political 
geography, especially when compared to its deployment in critical international 
relations (see Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998). The provenance of performativity – 
from its origins in J. L. Austin‟s speech act theory, through Jacques Derrida‟s 
appropriation of Austin to Butler‟s reworking of Derrida – establishes its utility as a 
set of theoretical assumptions about agency and power that can negotiate the 
ideal/material dichotomy without privileging on side over the other. Performativity 
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challenges any implicit valorisation of linguistic representations within post-
structuralist approaches without resorting to non-representational theory‟s tendency to 
reinstall an ideal/material hierarchy by emphasizing lived practice over and above 
images and texts (see the discussion in Nash, 2000). Given this, it is paradoxical that 
the deployment of Butler‟s work on performativity in cultural geography, while 
highlighting its challenge to notions of autonomous and wilful subjectivity, has ended 
up endorsing a “hyper-voluntarist gender politics where it is assumed that we can 
meddle at will with our gender identities, changing them as we choose” (Lloyd, 1999: 
209). Likewise, it is paradoxical that some critics of cultural geography‟s embrace of 
performativity transfer the pitfalls of a particular (and flawed reading) of 
performativity by geographers to pitfalls in Butler‟s conception of performativity 
itself (see Nelson, 1999). Of course Butler‟s arguments warrant critical interrogation, 
but Nelson‟s (1999: 332) assertion that Butler “jettisons agency altogether” betrays a 
limited understanding of how performativity challenges the way both advocates and 
critics of agency approach the issue. To be sure, Butler‟s argument contests the idea 
of the autonomous subject – but she does not seek to dispense with agency per se. As 
Nash (2000: 654) argues, “for Butler the concept of performativity is an attempt to 
find a more embodied way of rethinking the relationships between determining social 
structures and personal agency.” This involves a comprehensive engagement with 
agency rather than a presumption of pre-given subjectivity. As Butler writes: 
 
agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental 
actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that 
politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its 
agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be 
 7 
presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its 
construction...In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a 
pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that 
agency is always and only a political prerogative (Butler, 1992: 13). 
 
In addition to the politics of agency engaged through performativity, the value of this 
theoretical framework for a consideration of state security policy lies in the way 
performativity can help account for change over time. That is because performativity 
draws attention to “the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces 
the effects that it names” (Butler, 1993: 2). Instead of there being a singular moment 
of constitution or invention that brings subjects into being, there is a process of re-
citation and repetition (which Butler identifies as synonymous with “the more limited 
notion of resignification” [Osborne and Segal, 1994]) that is constrained by cultural 
and historical practices, but which also gives rise to new formations and possibilities 
(Lloyd, 1999: 197).  
 
As a result, performativity differs from construction because, as Butler has argued, 
constructivist arguments tend to operate in two predominant ways. In the first, 
discourse becomes an omnipotent force so deterministic that „it‟ acts as the governing 
subject such that all accounts of human agency are expunged. This would produce an 
argument that emphasized linguistic features and paid insufficient attention to the 
materiality of discourse. In the second – which maintains the logic of the first, but 
changes the character of the subject – the volitional human agent reigns supreme and 
wilfully engages in construction without constraint (Butler, 1993: 4-12). In the 
context of international relations, this would produce an argument in which policy 
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makers or other agents are regarded as being engaged in a sort of conscious and 
deliberate construction of reality. Such a position might assume, at least indirectly, 
that policy makers are located outside of the domain of constitution, and have 
intentional control over variables such as culture, history and identity. 
 
It is, finally, important to call attention to the difference between performativity and 
performance. Performativity is a discursive mode through which ontological effects 
(the idea of the autonomous subject or the notion of the pre-existing state) are 
established. Performativity thereby challenges the notion of the naturally existing 
subject. But it does not eradicate the appearance of the subject or the idea of agency. 
Performance presumes a subject and occurs within the conditions of possibility 
brought into being by the infrastructure of performativity. This is especially important 
when it comes to considering the role of named individuals in the development and 
furtherance of security policy. Although the citation of such names gives the 
appearance of wilful subjects exercising agency with volition, we argue in this paper, 
despite calling attention to the performances of individuals or policies, that the 
continuities between groups of security officials and the arguments they propagate 
demonstrates that importance of performativity (especially re-citation and reiteration 
as constraints on those performances) in the production of policy.  
 
Methodologically this approach requires an alternative model of explanation, one best 
explicated by William Connolly‟s (2005: 869) argument that classical models of 
explanation based on “efficient causality” – whereby “you first separate factors and 
then show how one is the basic cause, or they cause each other, or how they together 
reflect a more basic cause” – need to give way to the idea of ““emergent causality.” In 
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this conception, politics is understood as a resonant process in which 
 
diverse elements infiltrate into the others, metabolizing into a moving 
complex – Causation as resonance between elements that become fused 
together to a considerable degree. Here causality, as relations of dependence 
between separate factors, morphs into energized complexities of mutual 
imbriciation and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected or loosely 
associated elements fold, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging 
a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation 
(Connolly, 2005: 870. See also Connolly, 2004).  
 
In this context, it is important to understand what an individually named subject 
signifies, and how we can understand the place of agency within performativity once 
pre-given subjectivity is contested. In his account of the contemporary American 
political condition, William Connolly argues that, in contradistinction to any idea of a 
conspiratorial cabal exercising command, the US is run by a “theo-econopolitical 
[resonance] machine” in which the Republican party, evangelical Christians, elements 
of the electronic media and “cowboy capitalists” come together in emergent and 
resonant, rather than efficient, relationships (Connolly, 2005: 878). This means the 
major public figures – like the President and prominent media commentators – need 
to be understood in particular ways. As Connolly (2005: 877) argues: 
 
It is pertinent to see how figures such as Bush and O‟Reilly dramatize the 
resonance machine. But while doing so, it is critical to remember that they 
would merely be oddball characters unless they triggered, expressed and 
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amplified a resonance machine larger than them. They are catalyzing agents 
and shimmering points in the machine; their departure will weaken it only if it 
does not spawn new persona to replace them.  
 
To support the emphasis accorded performativity rather than construction, in this 
paper we are concerned with some of the people and practices operating beyond what 
are usually conceived as the „official‟ circles of the state. What we aim to indicate in 
this article, by way of an outline of a broader research agenda for political 
geographers, are the ways in which the imaginative geographies performed by a 
variety of „security advisers‟ and popular-academic commentators beyond the 
administration of George W. Bush have subsequently been invoked by the 
administration. We also consider, albeit more briefly, the ways in which popular 
geopolitical imaginaries – in particular, those circulating within current video games 
and in the mass media – resonate with and reinforce elements of those strategies (cf. 
Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Power & Crampton, 2005; Sharp, 2000). Our overall 
claim is that by identifying the citational practices that are reiterated in cultural and 
political sites outside the formal institutions of the state we can begin to appreciate the 
function performative imaginative geographies play in leading to the expenditure of a 
nation‟s blood and treasure.  
 
It is important to highlight the way performativity‟s idea of reiteration calls attention 
to changes in historically established imaginative geographies. While US foreign 
policy has been traditionally written in the context of identity/difference expressed in 
self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in recent strategic performances a 
different articulation of America‟s relationship to the world. Signified by the notion of 
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integration we identify elements in the formation of a new imaginative geography 
which enables the US to draw countries into its spheres of influence and control. We 
show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been enunciated over 
the last fifteen years through popular-academic books, think-tank documents, policy 
programmes and security strategies, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This 
concept of integration, we argue, is enacted through a number of practices of 
representation and coercion that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes 
and ways of operating or else suffer the consequences. As such, we are witnessing the 
performance of a security problematic that requires critical perspectives to move 
beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order to account for 
more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of new, mobile 
geographies of exclusion.  
 
NON-STATE SCRIBES 
 
To understand the imaginative geographies guiding current US strategy it is important 
to look back in time because it is the recitation, reiteration and resignification of 
previous strategic formulations that grants such geographies power. During the 
Clinton years, a number of figures who had been involved in various guises in 
previous Republican administrations wrote widely on the geopolitical opportunities 
and threats of a post Cold-War era. From specifications of the threat posed by 
international terrorism, „failed states‟ and „rogue regimes‟, to the dangers posed by 
cultural/civilisational conflicts. The individuals and institutions we choose to examine 
in this section are those whose geographical imaginations have been central in laying 
the ground for some of the securitizing strategies of the current Bush administration 
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and, specifically, whose work has been key in specifying the importance of 
“integrating” a chaotic world where conflict is inevitable.  
 
The writers whose work we highlight here occupy a liminal position within policy 
circles. While not paid members of the administration, they have either occupied such 
positions in the past or were aspiring to them in the future. They do not, therefore, 
directly speak for the state (a position that grants them a veneer of “objectivity”), and 
they navigate in the interstices between academic and “policy-oriented” research: a 
location that, in turn, absolves them from the rigors of a scholarly discipline, 
including disciplinary critique. We adopt the nomenclature of „non-state scribes‟ to 
indicate, then, a community of „experts‟ who belong to what historian of science Peter 
Galison (1997) terms a “trading zone” of specialists; individuals and institutions that 
straddle the boundaries of academic/non-academic work, spread across governmental 
and private research centres, think-tanks and study groups. What we would like to 
highlight are some of the ways in which their influence problematises simple, secure 
understandings of the state and the constitution of „state-interest‟. While these 
individuals appear as impartial commentators-cum-advisers-cum-analysts (as their 
book jackets testify), their access to policy circles is open, if not privileged. To the 
extent that their geographical imaginations are invoked by state power, they are also 
today‟s consummate “intellectuals of statecraft”: those who “designate a world and 
„fill‟ it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas” (Ó Tuathail and 
Agnew, 1992: 192). 
 
Certainly the most prominent such self-styled „community of experts‟ intersection 
with the Bush administration is the Project for a New American Century (for critical 
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analysis see Sparke, 2005). The PNAC, founded in the spring of 1997, defines itself 
as a “non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global 
leadership”. Putatively laying outside “formal” policy networks, the Project from its 
inception has aimed to provide the intellectual basis for continued US military 
dominance – and especially the willingness to use its military might:     
 
As the 20
th
 century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world‟s 
most pre-eminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, 
America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the 
vision to build upon the achievement of past decades? Does the United States 
have the resolve to shape a new century favourable to American principles and 
interests? [What we require] is a military that is strong and ready to meet both 
present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully 
promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the 
United States‟ global responsibilities (1997) 
 
As sole hegemon, PNAC argued, the US could not “avoid the responsibilities of 
global leadership”. But it should not simply “react” to threats as they present 
themselves: it should, rather, actively shape the global scenario before such threats 
emerge: “the history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to 
shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become 
dire” (2000: i).  
 
The resonance of these views with those of the Bush administration should come as 
no surprise: among the Project‟s founders were individuals who had held posts in 
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previous Republican administrations and went on to serve in  Bush‟s cabinet: Vice-
President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy and now 
World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, along with ambassador to Iraq Zalmay 
Khalilzad, in addition to well known neo-conservatives shaping policy debates in the 
US today, including Francis Fukuyama, Norman Podhoretz, and William Kristol (see 
Williams 2005; and Fukuyama 2006). Unsurprisingly, the most explicit formulation 
of what would become goals of the Bush administration can be found in the PNAC‟s 
manifesto Rebuilding America’s Defenses, which appeared in the election year of 
2000. Here and in subsequent documents, the PNAC envisages the US military‟s role 
to be fourfold: “Defend the American Homeland”; “fight and decisively win multiple, 
simultaneous major theatre wars”; “perform the „constabulary‟ duties associated with 
shaping the security environment in critical regions”; and “transform U.S. forces to 
exploit the „revolution in military affairs‟ (2000: iv, 5; cf. The White House, 2002b: 
30). 
 
It is telling just how spatialised some of these specifications become when worked 
through in detail. Already in 2000, PNAC argued that the major military mission is no 
longer to deter Soviet expansionism, but to “secure and expand zones of democratic 
peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit 
transformation of war” (2000: 2). They suggested that rather than the Cold War‟s 
“potential global war across many theatres”, the concern now is for several “potential 
theatre wars spread across the globe” fought against “separate and distinct adversaries 
pursuing separate and distinct goals” (2000: 2-3). To counter such threats, the US 
needs to station its troops broadly, and their presence “in critical regions around the 
world is the visible expression of the extent of America‟s status as a superpower and 
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as the guarantor of liberty, peace and stability” (2000: 14). They claimed that while 
US security interests have “expanded”, and that its forces “provide the first line of 
defense in what may be described as the „American security perimeter‟”, at the same 
time “the worldwide archipelago of U.S. military installations has contracted” (2000: 
14-15). Because the security perimeter “has expanded slowly but inexorably” since 
the end of the Cold War, US forces – “the cavalry on the new American frontier” – 
“must be positioned to reflect the shifting strategic landscape” (2000: 14-15; see 
Kagan and Kristol eds. 2000). Equally, their use of the term „homeland‟ drew strongly 
on its use in the Clinton administration – and prefigured the creation of the Office for 
Homeland Security under G.W. Bush, with the concept strengthened by both the 
PATRIOT acts and the establishment of U.S. Northern Command. (see 
http://www.northcom.mil/; and Pease 2003).  
 
Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing, and 
making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways “the world is” and, in so doing, 
actively (re)making that same world. This goes beyond merely the military action or 
aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the 
production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular 
imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies 
are at the heart of this paper and will re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies 
specifically with the ways in which the US portrays – and over the past decade has 
portrayed – certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as threats, as zones of 
instability, as rogue states, “states of concern”, as “global hotspots”, as well as the 
associated suggestion that by bringing these within the “integrated” zones of 
democratic peace, US security – both economically and militarily – can be preserved. 
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Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly 
results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish 
to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. 
This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least 
in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat (see Campbell 
1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats and enemies that 
emerged to fill the post-Soviet void – from radical Islam through the war on drugs to 
“rogue states” (for a critical analyses see, among others, Benjamin and Simon, 2003; 
Steel, 1995; Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of “rogue states” see Blum, 
2002; Chomsky, 2000; Litwak, 2000; Tanter, 1999; as well as the comments in 
Borradori, 2003). 
 
What is crucial in the rendering of these strategies, rather, is how those perceived 
threats are to be dealt with. PNAC, for instance, urged Clinton to take a more hawkish 
line on Iraq in a 1998 letter (signed by many who would later populate the Bush 
administration), which concluded with an exhortation: “We urge you to act decisively. 
If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its 
allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental national security interests of the 
country. If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our 
future at risk” (PNAC 1998). 
 
Yet another of PNAC‟s co-founders chose to remain on the „outside‟, however – and 
it is to his work that we now turn. The „scribe‟ in question is Robert Kagan, who in 
June 2002 published a highly influential piece on the foreign policy journal Policy 
Review.
1
At the time, Kagan was a political commentator for the Washington Post and 
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a writer for a number of conservative monthlies, and had served in the State 
Department from 1984 to 1998. In the early 1980s he was a member of the 
Department‟s policy planning unit, and worked in the first Bush Administration as 
Secretary of State George Schultz‟s speechwriter.  
 
Entitled “Power and Weakness”, Kagan‟s essay detailed what he argued was the 
increasingly evident disparity between American and European worldviews, 
particularly with regard to the conduct of international affairs. But his analysis, as we 
will argue here, constituted above all a justification for American power, and its 
exercise wherever and however necessary. Kagan‟s analysis – as part of a wider 
“understanding” of the ways in which the post-Cold War world “works” developed by 
neo-conservative intellectuals – would prepare the ground, indeed, make 
“indispensable”, US unilateralism and its doctrine of pre-emptive action. 
 
Kagan‟s article was highly influential, just as Fukuyama‟s (1989, 1992) “The End of 
History?” had been 12 years before, because of his profile within the foreign policy 
establishment, and because Kagan (as Fukuyama) was speaking to friends and 
colleagues – and, in many ways, reiterating a set of shared understandings. Kagan‟s 
claims have been widely discussed, lauded and refuted by academics and political 
leaders alike (see, for example, the critiques in Balibar, 2003; Bauman, 2004; 
Bialasiewicz and Elden, 2006; Blatter fur deutsche und internationale politik, 2002; 
Habermas, 2004; Young, 2005), so we will present them here only in brief. Kagan‟s 
central claim was that Europeans and Americans no longer share a common view of 
the world and, moreover, that in essential ways they can be understood as occupying 
different worlds: “Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, 
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it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and 
transnational negotiation and cooperation”. And while Europe has withdrawn into a 
mirage of Kantian „perpetual peace‟, the US has no choice but to act in a Hobbesian 
world of perpetual war. This state of affairs, for Kagan, is not the result of the 
strategic choices of a single administration, but a persistent divide and the reflection 
of fundamentally different perspectives on the world – and the role of Europe/the US 
within it (2002: 1).  
 
Kagan spends a significant part of his paper (and later book) analyzing what he terms 
“the psychology of power and weakness”.  It is a deeply troubling argument, for 
Kagan claims, at base, that Europeans believe in diplomacy and multilateralism 
because they are “weak”: “Europeans oppose unilateralism […] because they have no 
capacity for unilateralism” (Kagan, 2002: 7). What is more, he claims, the 
construction of the European “paradise”, the “geopolitical fantasy [of] a postmodern 
system [where] the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed; [where] 
Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian 
world of perpetual peace” (2002: 11) was made possible only by American power 
which assured the Cold War peace. America continues to hold this role because “post-
historical Europe” will not – and cannot; the US is forced to remain “stuck in history, 
left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang 
Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others” (Kagan, 2002: 16). As we have argued 
elsewhere, the US is thus invoked into a number of positions: as global leader (faced 
with Europe‟s failings/withdrawal), but also the only state able, due to its power-
position, to perceive threats clearly; the only one with a God‟s eye view of 
international affairs. It is thus, at once, the world‟s geo-politican and its geo-police; 
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the only state with the „knowledge‟ but also the capability to intervene (see 
Bialasiewicz and Elden 2006). 
 
Such attitudes clearly inform and reinforce the notion of „pre-emptive action‟ 
articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy. What is more interesting is that 
these ideas are also to be found in other contemporary calls for a proper ordering of 
the world that have issued from the broader community of „non-state‟ experts 
previously described. As we have suggested, what constitutes the force of such 
understandings is their performative – citational and reiterative – nature. These 
understandings echo and speak to each other, resonate with one another, thus 
reinforcing their validity as a faithful description of „the way the world is‟. Of these 
perhaps one of the most remarkable, and certainly the most explicitly geographical, is 
Thomas Barnett‟s “The Pentagon‟s New Map” (2004). Barnett‟s vision has not 
escaped political geographers‟ scrutiny: Roberts, Secor and Sparke (2003) have called 
attention to the power of Barnett‟s “binary spatial model” and what they termed its 
“neoliberal geopolitics.” More recently, Monmonier (2005) has traced the possible 
uses of Barnett‟s cartographies in justifying current and future US interventions.   
 
What we will do here is focus more narrowly on the ways in which the concept of 
“integration” is deployed in Barnett‟s work and the specification of the US‟s role in 
assuring such integration - at home, abroad, and by all means necessary. Barnett‟s 
cartography of international relations is of a disarming simplicity, rendered in map 
form as a globe divided into a “Functioning Core” and a “Non-Integrating Gap”: the 
Core torn by the “Gap”, figured as a dark stain spreading from the equator, spanning 
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most of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and leaching into the Balkans and Central 
Asia.  
 
“Non-Integrating” areas are those which are, in Barnett‟s (2004: 8) words, 
“disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability”. But 
dis-connection is not only a “problem” for these societies alone: “In this century, it is 
disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish 
by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their 
control. Eradicating disconnectedness, therefore, becomes the defining security task 
of our age” (Barnett, 2004: 8). 
 
Disconnection from the global community - or, as Roberts, Secor and Sparke (2003) 
argue, the global economy - also brings with it disconnection from the “rule sets” 
governing “proper” international behaviour: “enunciating that rule set is the most 
immediate task in this global war on terrorism, and promoting the global spread of 
that security rule set through our use of military force overseas (e.g. pre-emptive war 
against regimes that openly transgress the rule set) is our most important long-term 
goal in this struggle” (Barnett, 2004: 25). As noted above, the American role in the 
enunciation of a new “global rule set” has been the guiding preoccupation of the 
Project for the New American Century since its inception: a preoccupation which has 
been materialized within a number of the National Security Strategies (including the 
most recent iteration issued in March 2006).   
 
It is far from a selfish task, however: Barnett argues that it is America‟s “moral 
responsibility” to “share” the rule set: “[as] America seeks to export this new security 
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rule set called pre-emptive war, we are very careful in making sure this strategic 
concept is correctly understood. In short, pre-emptive war is not a tool for reordering 
the Core‟s security structure as some fear. Rather, it is an instrument by which the 
Core should collectively seek to extend its stable security rule set into the essentially 
lawless Gap” (Barnett, 2004: 7, 40).  
 
The United States must, once again, assume the role of “world maker”:  
 
Whether we realize it or not, we are all – right now – standing present at the 
creation of a new international security order. You might think that the global 
war on terrorism is nothing more than the twisted creation of a warmongering 
Bush Administration, but you would be wrong. The global conflict between 
the forces of connectedness and disconnectedness is here and it is not going 
away anytime soon. Either America steps up to the challenge of defining this 
new global security rule set, or we will see those rules established by people 
who dream of a very different tomorrow (Barnett, 2004: 45-46). 
 
As for Robert Kagan, for Barnett the United States‟ role is predicated upon, above all, 
a privileged knowledge of the rule sets (the ability to define “good” and “bad” states), 
a privileged understanding of “the ways the world works”, but also the willingness to 
enforce those rule sets. America is the Gap‟s Leviathan: “if other Core powers want a 
greater say in how we exercise that power, they simply need to dedicate enough 
defense spending to develop similar capabilities. Absent that, America earns a certain 
right for unilateralism in the Gap” (Barnett, 2004: 173-174). Similarly echoing Robert 
Kagan‟s dismissal of Europeans‟ “Kantian illusions”, Barnett is even more resolute in 
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affirming that such “illusions” have no place in today‟s chaotic and dangerous world. 
In justifying the United States resistance to the International Criminal Court, Barnett 
suggests that it is not a question of American “exceptionalism” but rather the fact 
“that America needs special consideration for the security roles it undertakes inside 
the Gap. In effect, we don‟t want fellow Core members applying their Kantian rule 
sets to our behavior inside the Hobbesian Gap” (Barnett, 2004: 174).  
 
As Roberts, Secor and Sparke (2003: 888) have argued in their critique, Barnett‟s 
“neoliberal world vision [obscures] more traditional geopolitics beneath Panglossian 
talk of global integration”: a geopolitics of absolutes where “might makes right”:  
“One of us must die. Either the Core assimilates the Gap, or the Gap divides the Core. 
Either the forces of connectivity prevail or the dictators of disconnectedness thrive. 
This cancer either spreads or we exterminate it. There is no exiting the Gap; there is 
only shrinking the Gap” (Barnett, 2004: 249-250). And the United States has learned 
the lesson the hard way: “September 11 told us that although deterrence still holds in 
the Core‟s Kantian peace, the reality of the Gap still being a Hobbesian world means 
deterrence is not enough” (Barnett, 2004: 261).  
 
Conflict is therefore inevitable: it is a foundational truth confirmed by the severed 
map.  Barnett‟s cartography thus serves as both a description of the today‟s world – 
and a prescription for its proper ordering. As Roberts, Secor and Sparke (2003: 890) 
argue, “the map is both that which is to be explained and the explanation itself, 
descriptive of the recent past and predictive of future action”. Insecurity comes not 
from a specific threatening other but from all those unwilling to integrate; all those 
refusing their (prescribed) place on the map. As Monmonier puts it, the map‟s “lines 
 23 
and labels not only rationalize the current [Iraqi] occupation…but also argue for 
future interventions throughout the Gap” (2005: 222). This understanding was clearly 
articulated in Barnett‟s first book (2004), but is even more explicit in the follow-up 
volume, revealingly entitled Blueprint for Action (2005). US interventions are thus 
presented as inevitable, until the messiness of the world is made to match the 
geometries of the Pentagon‟s New Map.  
 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES 
 
The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by 
both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration‟s 
foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State 
Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he 
wondered; 
 
Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of 
integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other 
major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should 
operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for 
free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these 
policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in 
Lemann 2002, emphasis added).
2
 
 
That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own 
democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers 
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to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not 
without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined 
geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the 
world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather,  the proliferation of new terms of 
antipathy such as „axis of evil‟, „rogue states,‟ and „terror cities‟ demonstrate how 
integration goes hand in hand with – and is mutually constitutive of – new forms of 
division (Bialasiewicz and Elden, 2006; Graham, 2006; Gregory, 2004a; Tuastad, 
2003). Barnett‟s divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is 
reflected and complemented by Kagan‟s divide in ways of dealing with this state of 
affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of „the homeland‟. 
Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a 
relationship “between securing the homeland against encroachment of foreign 
terrorists and enforcing [US] national power abroad. The homeland may contract 
borders around a fixed space of the nation and nativity, but it simultaneously also 
expands the capacity of the United States to move unilaterally across the borders of 
other nations” (Kaplan, 2003: 87). 
 
Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US 
strategy. Since September 11
th
 2001 the US government and military have issued a 
number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and 
resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, creating a sense of 
boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world. Initially there 
was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security 
2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House 
2002b; see Der Derian 2003). These were followed by the “National Strategy for 
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Combating Terrorism” (NCT) and particular plans for Military Strategy, 
Counterintelligence Strategy, Defense Strategy and the “Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support” (The White House 2002a; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004; 
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive 2005; Department of Defense 
2005a, 2005b). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where “the National Military 
Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); 
and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” builds “upon the concept 
of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy” (Department 
of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy 
(2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles. 
 
As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key 
elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the 
link between the Bush administration‟s strategic view and the 1992 “Defense 
Planning Guidance” (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W Bush by 
Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis „Scooter‟ Libby‟, the DPG was the first neoconservative 
security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in 
which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise 
of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 1992a; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212).  
 
Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and rewritten with input 
from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin 
Powell (Tyler, 1992b). Nonetheless, Cheney‟s version still declared that; 
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The U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a 
new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors 
that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive 
posture to protect their legitimate interests. In non-defense areas, we 
must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial 
nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking 
to overturn the established political and economic order. We must 
maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even 
aspiring to a larger regional or global role (Cheney, 1993: 2). 
 
What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of 
George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as  
PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organisations – both 
inside and outside the formal state structures – running from the DPG, through PNAC 
to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw 
upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) – 
demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects 
are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be 
understood.  
 
As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National 
Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy 
and security strategy. It is telling that Bush‟s claim of “either you are with us, or you 
are with the terrorists” (2001) relies not on a straight-forward binary, as is sometimes 
suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, 
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a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush‟s most enthusiastic 
supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White and Wintour, 2001). This 
works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this 
statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of 
law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support 
for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can 
be found in some of British Prime Minister Blair‟s (2004) remarks about the 
significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush‟s notorious 
„axis of evil‟ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, 
but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world” (2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of 
the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to 
the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple 
binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of 
incorporation and the policy of integration. 
 
These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the 
US and followed by certain allies. It warns those who fail to integrate, by adopting US 
values (principally liberal „representative‟ democracy and market capitalism), that 
they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these 
representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also 
on its reflection and re-iteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and 
beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe‟s “Old” and 
“New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 “Defense 
Planning Guidance” – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US 
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in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz and Minca, 2005). It is not 
surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice 
embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not 
trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United 
States and Europe (Bush, 2005). 
 
For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the 
new global scenario, its “right” – and the right of its moral-political “mission” of 
spreading “freedom and justice” – relies on its amplification and support by allies. 
The construction of the United States‟ world role relies also on the selective 
placement and representation of other international actors who are “hailed” into 
specific subject positions (see Milliken, 1999; Muppidi, 1999). Of course, different 
actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: 
the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral 
and semi-peripheral states that make part of the “coalition of the willing”. Both, 
however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared 
world of values and ideals. Indeed, the „lone superpower‟ has little influence in the 
absence of support.  
 
Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its 
dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines 
of the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” are particularly telling. It 
contends that the Department of Defense can “no longer think in terms of the „home‟ 
game and the „away‟ game. There is only one game” (Department of Defense, 2005b: 
40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: 
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indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11
th
 2001 attacks “originated in US 
airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air 
defense coordination” (2005b: 22; see also The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). In 
other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much 
as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a 
continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, 
promoted by a range of US “intellectuals of statecraft” since the end of the Cold War: 
understandings that specified increasingly hard territorialisations of security and 
identity both at home and abroad to counter the “geopolitical vertigo” (see Ó Tuathail, 
1996) of the post-bipolar era.  
 
It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy‟s 
affirmation that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is 
diminishing” (The White House, 2002: 30) also involves the US treating away as a 
home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration 
enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as 
specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 
2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s 
enunciation of an „arc of crisis‟ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle 
East to Afghanistan: “There exists an „arc of instability‟ stretching from the Western 
Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are 
areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within 
these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from 
surveillance and attack” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5) 
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Indeed, in his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that 
“We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the 
peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace 
by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (Bush, 2002b: i). This 
notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this 
strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is 
about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of 
world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably 
descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly 
contains the prescription for putting the world “right”.   
 
IMAGINATIVE GEOGRAPHIES AND POPULAR GEOPOLITICS 
 
As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of 
certain understandings of the world within the context of which the strategies and 
understandings advanced by them are rendered believable. What is more, we have 
tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations, even as their 
reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide 
the conditions of possibility for current – and future – action. Integration thus marks a 
new performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than 
replaces earlier formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal 
of integration, as we have seen, necessarily invokes the idea of exclusion. The 
imagined divide between the US „homeland‟ and the threatening, „frontier‟ lands 
within the circle of Barnett‟s „Non-Integrating Gap‟ thus recalls earlier iterations of 
„barbarism‟ even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a simple 
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self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks 
regarding the disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such 
imaginations. First, however, we would like to highlight some other ways in which 
these deployments of categories of inclusion and incorporation, on the one hand, and 
exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular geopolitical 
work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive 
of the „war on terror‟ at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the 
idea of fundamentally terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the 
„homeland‟ zone of the continental US as an homogenous and virtuous „domestic‟ 
community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are nonetheless imbricated 
with each other are further indication that we are dealing with performativity rather 
than construction in the production of imaginative geographies. 
 
The first example – that of media cartography – concerns the consumption by 
Western publics of the US urban bombing campaigns that have been such a dominant 
feature of the „war on terror‟. These involve representations in which the regions and 
metropolitan areas that were bombed have been constructed as receiving points for the 
dropping of murderous ordnance. Verticalized web and newspaper maps, for example, 
have routinely displayed cities like Baghdad as little more than impact points where 
GPS-targeted munitions are envisaged as landing along flat, cartographic surfaces 
(Gregory, 2004a). Meanwhile, the weapons‟ actual impacts on the everyday life for 
the ordinary Iraqis or Afghanis who are „collateral damage‟ have been both 
marginalized and repressed by the US military through the denial of media access and 
a refusal to record civilian casualties (see Gregory 2004b).  
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The spatialization of good and evil that results from these reinscribed binaries is in 
stark contrast to the imaginative geographies of other US global discourses, especially 
that of the accelerating flows of globalization, which inevitably undermine such 
simplistic moral cartographies. The challenge of this tension is to be found both 
„home‟ and „away‟. Take, for example, the situation of large, cosmopolitan 
metropolitan areas in the US. Here, discourses of the „homeland‟ problematize the 
inherently diverse and mobile fabric of the diasporas that actually constitutes US 
urbanism.  The September 11th 2001 attacks themselves provided a perverse reminder 
of the stark geopolitical tensions between the diasporic formation of contemporary US 
cities and efforts to construct simple imaginative geographies of national communities 
who are purportedly under threat from externalised, terroristic people and places (see 
Watson 2003).  
 
Abroad, one contradiction between the moral cartography of terror and the spatiality 
of globalization can be found in the attention US national security discourse pays to 
the deepening connectivity between domestic US space and burgeoning circuits of 
computer communication, electronic transaction, and organized criminal activity. 
These connectivities tie the US into networked formations which links it with the 
territories of Barnett‟s „Non-Integrating Gap‟. Significant here is the US military‟s 
discussion of the risk of cyber-terrorism; their efforts to clamp down on transitional 
financial dealings of alleged terrorist sympathizers; or their analyses of the biological 
pathogens which routinely flow around the world‟s airline and shipping systems 
(NCT, 2002). These bring into being a world in which "everything and everywhere is 
perceived as a border from which a potentially threatening Other can leap" (Hage, 
2003: 86). Such a world of porosity, flow and rhizomatic, fibrous connectivities, is 
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deeply at odds with the imaginative geographies of exclusion and their moral 
cartography.  
 
Other examples of popular geopolitics that sustain the exclusive binaries of the 
„homeland‟s‟ imaginative geography can be found in the recent proliferation of urban 
warfare video games; cinematic representations of events in the war on terror such as 
United 93 and the forthcoming No True Glory: The Battle for Fallujah; the latter 
being based on one of the many popular books to have been written on Iraq (West 
2005). The video games, such as America’s Army and Full Spectrum Warrior,3 are 
produced by media corporations in partnership with the US military, inscribing the 
geopolitical demarcation of „homeland‟ game players across the American suburbs 
from the US military‟s battle for freedom in Iraq. Indeed, the video game industry 
seems to have “assumed a posture of co-operation towards a culture of permanent 
war” (Deck, 2004). The popularity of electronic simulations in which participants 
command military units to pacify and destroy terrorists in the wild zones of Middle 
Eastern cities, provides evidence of the popular geopolitical resonance of imaginative 
geographies promulgated by the formal security institutions of the United States.  
 
However as well as performing new frontiers in the permanent „war on terror‟ under 
the guise of fiction, urban warfare video games also blur into news reports of the Iraq 
war. For example, Kuma Reality Games – whose slogan is “Real War News. Real 
War Games” – have sponsored Fox News‟s openly supportive coverage of the „war 
on terror‟. They have used this sponsorship to promote a range of urban combat 
games which simulate all of the key military engagements of the Afghanistan and Iraq 
campaigns. One game, in their words, centres on US Marines fighting “militant 
 34 
followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in the filthy urban slum that is Sadr 
city.” Another recreates the 1982 Iraqi massacre at Dujail that is the basis for Saddam 
Hussein‟s war crimes trial. And Mission 58, released in September 2005 but 
foreshadowing a disturbing possibility, allows the player to be part of the special 
forces operating against Iran‟s nuclear program. All in all, it is not surprising that the 
company is able to state that “KumaWar simulates the dangers US and allied soldiers 
face with courage on a daily basis. We are honored that active duty US troops play 
KumaWar regularly, and we invite you to connect with them in our forums to give 
them your support” (see http://www.kumawar.com/). Fought also by suburban youth 
in the US, these games perform the imaginative geography of the war on terror by 
drawing on what Deck (2004) calls “a cult of ultra-patriotic xenophobes whose 
greatest joy is to destroy, regardless of how racist, imperialistic, and flimsy the 
rationale” for the simulated battle.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the aftermath of September the 11
th
 it has become commonplace to argue that the 
world had fundamentally changed. President Bush claimed as much when he declared 
the attacks of that day meant “the doctrine of containment just doesn‟t hold any 
water” and the strategic vision of the US had to shift dramatically (Bush, 2003). As a 
result, integration – into a western and American set of values and modus operandi – 
has become the new strategic concept. Distinct from the superficial binaries of the 
Cold War, integration nonetheless involves its own set of exclusions, with forms of 
violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated.  
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This paper has traced the emergence of integration as the basis for the imaginative 
geography of the „war on terror‟. It has done so by maintaining that the production of 
this imaginative geography should be understood in terms of performance rather than 
construction. That is because we are dealing with an assemblage of practices – state 
policy, „non-state scribes‟ and the representational technologies of popular geopolitics 
– which together produce the effect they name, stabilizing over time to produce a 
series of spatial formations through the performance of security. Given the manner in 
which this emergent imaginative geography has materialized in the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq – which was carried out in the name of terror and has created the 
very terror it named – it is clear when we speak of performance we are dealing with 
much than just thinking, writing or speaking differently.  
 
Yet in practice the materialization of such strategies and imaginations has rarely been 
straight-forward. In fact, in many instances the opposite of the intention has been 
created. We could point, for example to the ways in which „territorial integrity‟ was 
repeatedly mobilized as a war-aim in the invasion of Iraq and yet the consequence has 
been the creation of a state which is unable to protect its borders, cannot project its 
power effectively within them and is in danger of fragmentation into ethnically or 
religiously created regions (Elden 2007). The self-serving apologetics of many of 
those integrally involved in the framing of such policies – Barnett (2005) and 
Fukuyama (2006), for two – indeed indicate the resilience of the imaginaries we 
describe, clear and present failures notwithstanding; it is not that they got things 
wrong, for  the basic analysis still holds – it only needs to be enacted more effectively. 
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In the latest incarnations of these understandings – both in Barnett‟s new Blueprint for 
Action and within the pages of the 2006 National Security Strategy – we find a re-
playing of the basic chain of claims being made. Countries integrated into the global 
economy playing by American rules are less dangerous than those that do not; US 
security therefore depends on integrating those countries into that rule-set; US policy 
should be directed towards that goal. This, it is claimed, has benefits beyond merely 
military security and forms the foundation of economic security. Indeed, the first is 
often mobilized as the rationale when the second is more clearly the aim. Seemingly 
unconsciously, the 2006 National Security Strategy proclaims this as a key goal: 
“Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade” 
(2006: 1, 25). That the strategies in practice have often produced a process of dis-
integration, of a falling apart and a rending of connections previously made is beside 
the point in the pure idealism of this new realism. While Bush claims that “like the 
policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, our approach is idealistic about our 
national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them” (2006; see National 
Security Strategy 2006: 49), it may well be that it is unrealistic about the first 
precisely because it is idealistic about the second.  
 
Yet, as much as this emergent imaginative geography is new and specific to its time 
and place, so too does it recall a much earlier formulation, as we would expect of a 
performative geopolitics produced by recitation, reiteration and resignification. When 
the Spanish conquistadores landed in the New World they were tasked with reading 
out The Requirement each time they encountered indigenous people. Although based 
on the ideal belief that the Amerindians were people descended from God like the 
Spanish, this proclamation nonetheless threatened war, forcible conversion and 
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enslavement against the indigenous should they decide against the Holy Catholic 
Faith once they had been informed of it. Voluntary integration or violent exclusion 
were thus two modes of the same disposition towards the other, lodged within the 
same hierarchy of identity/difference (Campbell, 1992: 112-18). Nearly five centuries 
on, the challenge remains very much the same – can the security performances of the 
major power of the day relate to others in ways less violent and more ethical? 
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Notes 
 
1
  The essay was published in slightly revised form in 2003 as a short volume, 
entitled Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. 
 
2
  This argument is a departure from Haass‟s earlier positions. He had previously 
authored a book entitled The Reluctant Sheriff (1997) which argued against 
Wolfowitz‟s idea of expanding the „democratic zone of peace‟. But Haass 
more recently proposed a more active role for the US, suggesting that 
integration is the “successor idea to containment” (interview in Lemann 2002; 
see also Haass 2005). Indeed, according to Mann, the National Security 
Strategy was originally written by Haass, but on Condolezza Rice‟s insistence 
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was redrafted by Philip Zelikow, Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission 
(Mann 2004, p. 316). See http://hnn.us/articles/5280.html for some 
background on Zelikow.  
 
3
  See http://www.fullspectrumwarrior.co.uk/index.php for details. 
